This chapter examines the internal mechanisms for the protection of shareholders’ rights in Chinese FHCs, focusing specifically on shareholder governance, including both controlling shareholder engagement and minority shareholder rights protection. In terms of controlling shareholder engagement, the main problem of Chinese FHCs is the excessive engagement of controlling shareholders, which has been demonstrated in both listed and unlisted companies. On this basis, future Chinese FHCs should limit the engagement of controlling shareholders, which incorporates Chinese mixed-ownership reform. With respect to the protection of minority shareholders’ rights, the governance of FHCs in China needs to focus on both the role of the CPC and the governance structure. First, the participation of the CPC in corporate governance is an issue that cannot be avoided in the current governance of FHCs in China and that urgently needs to be addressed. In addition, the governance structure of Chinese FHCs breaks away from the traditional “one tyre” and “two tyres” structure, where the supervisory board and independent directors can coexist. Therefore, Chinese FHCs should actively address the governance gaps in the current governance structure.