This chapter examines mechanisms for the internal protection of shareholder rights in FHCs in jurisdictions beyond China, with a specific focus on corporate governance codes and annual reports. The book analyses two objectives of shareholder rights protection in FHCs at both the theoretical and practical levels: effective governance and sustainable success. These two objectives are reflected in the corporate governance codes of other jurisdictions. Specifically, one of the most typical institutional designs of corporate governance for achieving the goal of effective governance is the “Independent Board Member”. Furthermore, the book also reflects on the true binding nature of corporate governance codes, which are still subject to other commercial practices despite their lack of mandatory legal binding force. However, monitoring the implementation of corporate governance codes should be strengthened, which is a weak point in the current corporate governance codes. Sustainability success is not only based on systemic risk considerations but also on realising the right to a long-term return on shareholders’ dividends. Therefore, FHCs need to focus not only on the protection of shareholders’ rights but also on the balance of interests between shareholders and other stakeholders.

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Legal Analysis of Shareholders’ Rights Protection in the Corporate Governance Codes for Financial Holding Companies Beyond China

  • Kailiang Ma

摘要

This chapter examines mechanisms for the internal protection of shareholder rights in FHCs in jurisdictions beyond China, with a specific focus on corporate governance codes and annual reports. The book analyses two objectives of shareholder rights protection in FHCs at both the theoretical and practical levels: effective governance and sustainable success. These two objectives are reflected in the corporate governance codes of other jurisdictions. Specifically, one of the most typical institutional designs of corporate governance for achieving the goal of effective governance is the “Independent Board Member”. Furthermore, the book also reflects on the true binding nature of corporate governance codes, which are still subject to other commercial practices despite their lack of mandatory legal binding force. However, monitoring the implementation of corporate governance codes should be strengthened, which is a weak point in the current corporate governance codes. Sustainability success is not only based on systemic risk considerations but also on realising the right to a long-term return on shareholders’ dividends. Therefore, FHCs need to focus not only on the protection of shareholders’ rights but also on the balance of interests between shareholders and other stakeholders.