This chapter analyses the mechanisms for protecting the two core rights of shareholders of FHCs in China, namely, the right to vote and the right to information. With respect to the right to vote, logically, the protection of voting rights for shareholders of FHCs is concerned with two important issues: who votes and how they vote. With respect to the former, the voter is identified as the shareholder, and the share of the shareholder is closely related to the right to vote, so the focus on shares is a fundamental issue in realising shareholders’ voting rights. In terms of how to vote, the current cumulative voting system in the Chinese legal system can be examined, and adherence to mandatory cumulative voting under prudential standards can be argued. In relation to the right to information, there is an urgent need to improve the regulation of disclosure regarding shareholder information in China. It is based partly on the shortcomings of the current Chinese disclosure regime and aims to achieve Chinese financial regulatory objectives in the future.

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Rethinking the Financial Market Regulation of Shareholders’ Rights in Chinese Financial Holding Companies

  • Kailiang Ma

摘要

This chapter analyses the mechanisms for protecting the two core rights of shareholders of FHCs in China, namely, the right to vote and the right to information. With respect to the right to vote, logically, the protection of voting rights for shareholders of FHCs is concerned with two important issues: who votes and how they vote. With respect to the former, the voter is identified as the shareholder, and the share of the shareholder is closely related to the right to vote, so the focus on shares is a fundamental issue in realising shareholders’ voting rights. In terms of how to vote, the current cumulative voting system in the Chinese legal system can be examined, and adherence to mandatory cumulative voting under prudential standards can be argued. In relation to the right to information, there is an urgent need to improve the regulation of disclosure regarding shareholder information in China. It is based partly on the shortcomings of the current Chinese disclosure regime and aims to achieve Chinese financial regulatory objectives in the future.