Aiming at the problems of single pricing and unclear targeted trading mechanism of shared energy storage when providing leasing services for renewable energy stations, this paper proposes a novel lease pricing strategy of shared energy storage based on the bounded rational behavior of renewable energy stations. Considering the bounded rational characteristics of renewable energy stations, a Stackelberg game model considering the prospect theory is proposed. In this game, the shared energy storage acts as a leader and decides its profit-maximizing pricing strategy; the renewable energy stations act as followers and optimize its total cost by deciding the power of leasing energy storage. The proposed game explains the subjective decisions of each renewable energy station facing price uncertainty, which is caused by the stochastic energy storage leasing price. Considering the bounded rational characteristics of renewable energy stations and using prospect theory to describe the subjective behavior of bounded rational individuals facing uncertain leasing price, the equilibrium solution is obtained. Finally, the results of an example show that, compared with estimating the completely rational leasing decision of renewable energy stations, the novel lease pricing mechanism better reflects its real leasing behavior, and verifies the correctness and feasibility of adopting prospect theory to the lease pricing strategy for shared energy storage.