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This chapter investigates security vulnerabilities in the HTTP/3 protocol, particularly focusing on client-side request forgery attacks. We analyze different attack vectors, including server initial request forgery and connection migration request forgery, to comprehensively assess the associated risks. Our research employs simulations involving a vulnerable HTTP/3 website to expose potential weaknesses in both the protocol design and its implementation. These findings highlight the critical need for robust security measures to mitigate the threat of request forgery in modern web communication protocols. Notably, this work explores an alternative approach to traditional DNS-based request forgery by manipulating data directly within HTTP/3 packets.

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Beyond DNS Poisoning: HTTP/3 Request Forgery Through Packet Data Tampering

  • 会议论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年

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  • B. Shebu,
  • Chungath Srinivasan,
  • P. P. Amritha

摘要

This chapter investigates security vulnerabilities in the HTTP/3 protocol, particularly focusing on client-side request forgery attacks. We analyze different attack vectors, including server initial request forgery and connection migration request forgery, to comprehensively assess the associated risks. Our research employs simulations involving a vulnerable HTTP/3 website to expose potential weaknesses in both the protocol design and its implementation. These findings highlight the critical need for robust security measures to mitigate the threat of request forgery in modern web communication protocols. Notably, this work explores an alternative approach to traditional DNS-based request forgery by manipulating data directly within HTTP/3 packets.