Differential Fault Attack on Ultra-lightweight Block Cipher BORON
摘要
BORON is an ultra-lightweight block cipher (ULW-BC) designed for low-power encryption of pervasive computing by Bansod et al. (Pisharoty N, Patil A, J Zhejiang Univ Sci C 18:317–331, 2017) in 2017. They also give the analysis of this cipher in various conventional attacks, but there is no analysis of the side channel cryptanalysis resistance of the cipher. In this chapter, we demonstrated that BORON is vulnerable to fault attack and analyzed it by attacking with both one faulty sbox and all faulty sboxes scenarios. If the fault is injected into one sbox, on average, we can retrieve an 80-bit key in 40 faults and a 128-bit key in 160 faults. This complexity is reduced to 3 faults for 80-bit key and 12 faults for a 128-bit key on average when fault is injected into all sboxes.