This chapter applies the corporate constitutional paradigm to Carillion’s governance failure as an alternative to the contractual model. It examines internal governance, including corporate constitution, decision-making, legitimacy of corporate power, and mechanisms of accountability, deliberation, and contestability, as well as external governance, including the roles of regulators, government, and law. Through a speculative approach, it assesses how embedding corporate constitutionalism might have addressed systemic flaws and considers its potential to prevent similar corporate collapses.

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Reassessing Carillion’s Collapse from Corporate Constitutional Perspective

  • Yifei Yang

摘要

This chapter applies the corporate constitutional paradigm to Carillion’s governance failure as an alternative to the contractual model. It examines internal governance, including corporate constitution, decision-making, legitimacy of corporate power, and mechanisms of accountability, deliberation, and contestability, as well as external governance, including the roles of regulators, government, and law. Through a speculative approach, it assesses how embedding corporate constitutionalism might have addressed systemic flaws and considers its potential to prevent similar corporate collapses.