Yang Guorong argues that moral selfhood is constituted intersubjectively. Virtue, Yang tells us, arises from recognizing the relational nature of the moral self. This argument draws on views in classical Confucianism that establish the fundamental importance of other persons’ development and achievements to one’s own virtue—views that have also been central to and robustly developed by the full array of venerable philosophers honored in this volume. This chapter draws out the prescient insights of Yang’s arguments and locates them within the historical Confucian tradition more broadly. In doing so, it indicates their coherence and success as a Confucian moral theory, while also pointing to their pertinence to contemporary moral philosophy more broadly. In arguing that moral obligations are extensions of relationships, Yang draws on a wide range of sources, employing a vocabulary and references that cross traditions. Thus, Yang Guorong’s work is a paradigmatic example of how theories developed through multiple traditions may be “beyond comparison.”