This chapter is purported to undertake a preliminary understanding of apophasis also known as negative theology, which is a theological discourse that presumes that human language as an empirical human tool cannot adequately convey reliable knowledge about supreme Reality and, therefore, is inadequate to speak about transcendent realities. Hence, to maintain the transcendence of the transcendent, negative theology takes recourse to discard the positive characterization of the transcendent but speaks of it by way of what can be broadly called ‘negative dialectical’ strategies. The chapter delves deeper into how the Upanishads used the negative theological method in their expressions of the absolute or the supreme Being. For instance, to say that God is non-good is to open our minds to an infinite number of possibilities about God. The chapter consists of three sections. The first section of the chapter attempts to clarify the method itself and its broad operational context. The second section deals with the origins of the negative method in the Indian intellectual context as a precursor to my treatment of its use in the Vedas and the principal Upanishads. For the Vedic seers, language and human understanding cannot substitute its essence and existence. The chapter is intended to foreground the method with which this study is primarily concerned and thus, the necessary background upon which the interpretive scope yielded by the analysis of the later chapters is to be grounded. The third section of the chapter argues that the negative way of speaking in the Upanishads is a method that seeks to answer the limits of language. The Upanishads developed a more self-assured negative dialectic because of the limitations of the language and its inability to comprehend and express the supreme. As for the Upanishads, Brahman as the apophatic object is the non-intentional consciousness without any object. The contention for the Vedantin is based on the postulation that Ultimate Reality or Brahman is subject-objectless consciousness, which stands outside linguistic possibilities. There is neither a sense of the “I” nor a sense of anything other than the “I” in Brahman. But in the measure of this apophatic action, there is a phenomenal nought, the nought of the Self, the denial and turning away from the self towards a Self as not the Other. The chapter contends that subjectivity—or, to use the Upanishadic term, witnessing consciousness—can help us understand the ultimate meaning of apophatic objects.

Revival of an Ancient Way: Traditional Negative Theology and Its Upanishadic Version

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2025年

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Sebastian Velassery

摘要

This chapter is purported to undertake a preliminary understanding of apophasis also known as negative theology, which is a theological discourse that presumes that human language as an empirical human tool cannot adequately convey reliable knowledge about supreme Reality and, therefore, is inadequate to speak about transcendent realities. Hence, to maintain the transcendence of the transcendent, negative theology takes recourse to discard the positive characterization of the transcendent but speaks of it by way of what can be broadly called ‘negative dialectical’ strategies. The chapter delves deeper into how the Upanishads used the negative theological method in their expressions of the absolute or the supreme Being. For instance, to say that God is non-good is to open our minds to an infinite number of possibilities about God. The chapter consists of three sections. The first section of the chapter attempts to clarify the method itself and its broad operational context. The second section deals with the origins of the negative method in the Indian intellectual context as a precursor to my treatment of its use in the Vedas and the principal Upanishads. For the Vedic seers, language and human understanding cannot substitute its essence and existence. The chapter is intended to foreground the method with which this study is primarily concerned and thus, the necessary background upon which the interpretive scope yielded by the analysis of the later chapters is to be grounded. The third section of the chapter argues that the negative way of speaking in the Upanishads is a method that seeks to answer the limits of language. The Upanishads developed a more self-assured negative dialectic because of the limitations of the language and its inability to comprehend and express the supreme. As for the Upanishads, Brahman as the apophatic object is the non-intentional consciousness without any object. The contention for the Vedantin is based on the postulation that Ultimate Reality or Brahman is subject-objectless consciousness, which stands outside linguistic possibilities. There is neither a sense of the “I” nor a sense of anything other than the “I” in Brahman. But in the measure of this apophatic action, there is a phenomenal nought, the nought of the Self, the denial and turning away from the self towards a Self as not the Other. The chapter contends that subjectivity—or, to use the Upanishadic term, witnessing consciousness—can help us understand the ultimate meaning of apophatic objects.