Digital Twin (DT) has been proposed as a key enabling technology to produce a digital clone of the physical world and facilitate the convergence of the physical and virtual worlds for building a real-world Metaverse. For physical-virtual synchronization, crowdsensing is applied to employ Internet of Things (IoT) devices to sense physical objects and collect status information for timely updating the associated DTs. However, an incentive mechanism is necessitated to stimulate the devices to perform sensing tasks while meeting task requirements such as Age of Information (AoI) requirements. Thus, we adopt a contract theoretic approach to design an incentive mechanism for the devices that are classified into several types and the type parameters are unknown to others. The contract consists of a set of contract items with each contract item representing a device type, which specifies the required data updating frequency and monetary reward. We formulate an optimal contract design problem subject to feasible constraints including the average AoI requirement for each device type. Furthermore, we solve the problem by transforming it into a convex optimization problem that can be directly tackled by the existing methods. Finally, we provide numerical results to demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our scheme.

错误:搜索内容不能为空,请输入英文关键词
错误:关键词超出字数限制,请精简
高级检索

Incentivizing Crowdsensing for DT-Enabled Metaverse

  • Dongdong Ye,
  • Xumin Huang,
  • Yuan Wu,
  • Jiawen Kang,
  • Weifeng Zhong,
  • Dusit Niyato

摘要

Digital Twin (DT) has been proposed as a key enabling technology to produce a digital clone of the physical world and facilitate the convergence of the physical and virtual worlds for building a real-world Metaverse. For physical-virtual synchronization, crowdsensing is applied to employ Internet of Things (IoT) devices to sense physical objects and collect status information for timely updating the associated DTs. However, an incentive mechanism is necessitated to stimulate the devices to perform sensing tasks while meeting task requirements such as Age of Information (AoI) requirements. Thus, we adopt a contract theoretic approach to design an incentive mechanism for the devices that are classified into several types and the type parameters are unknown to others. The contract consists of a set of contract items with each contract item representing a device type, which specifies the required data updating frequency and monetary reward. We formulate an optimal contract design problem subject to feasible constraints including the average AoI requirement for each device type. Furthermore, we solve the problem by transforming it into a convex optimization problem that can be directly tackled by the existing methods. Finally, we provide numerical results to demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our scheme.