Entering the 2010s, with the significant slowing down of Chinese economy, the so-called Chinese “economic miracle” or “growth model” faced sever challenges. Combining some theoretical perspectives of economic development stages, capital accumulation regime with Chinese characteristics, and techno-economic paradigm, this chapter examines and explains how the Chinese growth miracle eventually fell into the “middle-income trap” and was on the edge of its own structural crisis after the world financial crisis in 2008. The story was that during 30 years, the “visible hand” of managing Chinese economy has progressively shifted from local governments’ initiative and experiments to central government’s macro policy supplemented with industrial economics tools. This fundamental change of how the economy is managed and controlled not only brought China’s growth from factor-driven to investment-driven stage, but also progressively decoupled the financial system from China’s local, dominant, accumulation regime, and directing finance into a technological accumulation regime. Ironically, Chinese central government’s anti-crisis monetary and fiscal policy in the years of 2008/2009 aggravated this long-term structural unbalance. In the “post-miracle” era, the Chinese central government tried at least three macroeconomic approaches to readdress the growth pattern: rebalancing, supply-side reform, and innovation-driven development. Among them, the innovation policy now seems to be the focus. At the same time, this chapter argues that innovation policy is fundamentally different from other types of economic policy. Its effectiveness depends very much on localized and diversified implementation by governments and companies.