When terrorism tactics are employed in a battlespace, do they enhance military effectiveness or not? This is the main research question that this chapter engages with. The chapter argues that terrorism tactics have been steadily migrating from the clandestine margins of secretive cells to the centre of contemporary semi-conventional campaigns. The chapter samples out multiple case-studies involving two actors, a nonstate force and a state force. The nonstate force is the ISIS, which employed industrial-scale suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs) within its overall IED-intensive way of warfare. The second actor is the combined armed and security forces of the Russian Federation, possessing much larger, nuclear-powered state forces. The Russian forces and their proxies have employed a broad-spectrum of terrorism tactics in a state re-appropriation of tactics perfected by ISIS. These tactics were most visible in Crimea and the Donbass (February-April 2014) and Kyiv Oblast (Province) during the first phase of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine (February-April 2022). Based on previous fieldworks and research, the chapter argues that terrorism tactics can generate lopsided loss-exchange ratios and accelerate operational breakthroughs. At the same time, they may trigger domestic and international backlash that corrodes the perpetrator’s grand strategy.