The mind-body problem is a long-standing philosophical issue that investigates the relationship between mental states and the physical brain, particularly through the lens of Cartesian dualism. The focus is on the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM), which posits that the mind can be understood as a computational model, where thought processes are defined as symbolic computations. Core to CTM is Fodor’s Language of Thought Hypothesis (LOTH) which postulates that thought operates in a structured, language-like system called “Mentalese,” governed by syntax. This framework aims at providing an account of the kinds of cognition that concern productivity, systematicity and compositionality, by interfacing abstract cognition with the computational process. The paper traces the historical development of the mind-body debate, from Plato’s early ideas to Descartes’ substance dualism, and discusses modern challenges such as behaviourism and functionalism, which paved the way for LOTH. Fodor’s theory of modularity, introduced in the 1970s, revolutionized cognitive science by asserting that thoughts arise from simple symbolic units. However, views such as connectionism and embodied cognition criticize LOTH for assuming a distinct symbolic organization emphasizing actual interactions. Proper understanding of the internal representation in the brain is continued with theories such as Neuralink’s BCI. Despite critiques, LOTH remains a significant contribution to contemporary research on cognition in both humans and machines. A framework for problem-solving is well-defined with the applications of Fadors theory.