Banquet Bribe, Social Trust and Hybrid Judicial Behaviour
摘要
In order to gain a competitive advantage in the highly saturated retail textbook market in Fukuoka, two bookstores engaged in the practice of offering banquet bribes to two teachers, totalling 34 instances over a period of two years. In the absence of statutory authorization to designate a textbook supplier, the two teachers’ powers in this regard were beyond the scope of their authority. Taishinin’s inferences regarding the quid pro quo in persistent food entertainments were derived from a standpoint of retailer, as viewed through the lens of retail marketing strategy and supply chain management. The mean cost of each culinary experience was not exorbitant. The prewar Penal Code did not establish a minimum value or threshold to qualify as a bribe. The judicial behaviour of Taishinin in this judgement exhibited a combination of the attitudinal model, the strategic model and the strict liability model. Without a thorough examination of culpable intent, Taishinin imposed a moralistic interpretation of criminal law on two educators, labelling their repeated acceptance of food entertainment as a transgression of social trust. This was a deliberate judicial policy that aimed to bolster the state’s confidence in the nationalist role assumed by educators.