According to the Twelve Tables of Rome (Zwölftafelgesetz), the owner of a four-legged beast (Vierfüßers) is liable for damages caused by the beast’s wildness (Wildheit). Then, can the owner of a two-legged beast, such as an ostrich in Africa, be held responsible for the damage caused by its wildness? In response to this, Paulus (Digesta 9.1.4.) interprets through analogy (Analogieschluß) that not only four-legged beasts but also other beasts that cause damage can be sued, arguing that it is legitimate to recognise responsibility in the case of creatures that can easily cause significant damage due to their animal nature, as this is the legal purpose of this clause. K. Engisch acknowledges this case as an example that shows that the superiority between analogy and reverse inference (Umkehrschluß) cannot be determined purely logically and must be combined with a certain purpose, but if the possible meaning (möglicher Wortsinn) of the legal text is set as the limit of interpretation, there is a limit to the linguistic meaning, so no matter how hard one tries, it cannot include an ostrich in the concept of a four-legged beast.