Ronald Dworkin, a renowned legal philosopher, has long expressed interesting views on the issue of free will and responsibility. To briefly put the gist of his argument, which could help readers’ understanding by contrasting sharply with the position of this book, it is as follows. Generally, responsibility is considered to be justifiably imposed only when free will acts as the originating cause of an act without being influenced by external forces (causal control theory), but according to Dworkin, the causal control theory is consistent with our sound intuition, but lacks other rational arguments to support it, and is vulnerable to the threat of determinism, so it is desirable to find other alternatives. He advocates the “ability control theory” as another alternative. According to this, the reason for taking responsibility for an act is because the actor has the “ability to consciously make decisions according to his personality, desires, beliefs, etc. while correctly recognising the external world.” Our decisions are true facts and are important in themselves and do not depend on causal explanations, because the value of one’s “life” depends on how good that decision is. In other words, the value of life does not depend on the distant or unknown causal history of that decision, but on the quality of the decision.