Financial sanctions have replaced trade sanctions as the main economic weapon in contemporary political conflicts. Focusing on the US-Russia confrontation since 2014, we contrast financial with trade sanctions, trace their macro-financial transmission, and assess Russia’s responses. A synthetic control counterfactual shows that sanctions lowered Russia’s per capita output, while a TVP-VAR links the shock to successive waves: an immediate hit to expectations, a sharp ruble fall, capital flight, and later contraction of the sovereign-bond market that raised borrowing costs. Russia tried to blunt these blows by trimming USD reserves, building domestic payment and settlement platforms, and encouraging ruble invoicing. These steps softened—but did not reverse—the drag; growth remains subdued and financial vulnerabilities linger. The evidence suggests three lessons for countries exposed to similar pressure: diversify reserve currencies, foster deep local capital markets and payment networks, and run regular stress tests to prepare for sudden funding shocks. For sanctioning coalitions, the study warns that aggressive financial measures can spill over to the wider system and provoke costly retaliation. Ultimately, lasting security is more likely to arise from negotiated accommodation than from escalating economic coercion.