An Incentive Compatible Mechanism for Two-Sided Matching Market in Mobile Crowdsourcing with Zero Budget
摘要
Mobile crowdsourcing refers to the use of mobile devices, such as smartphones and tablets, to gather information or perform tasks by leveraging the collective efforts of a large group of people. The paper considers one of the scenarios (setups) of the mobile crowdsourcing scenarios in a strategic setting. The setup consists of multiple task requesters and multiple task executors (or IoT devices). Each task requester is endowed with a single task. Each task requester reveals a preference list over the subset of IoT devices, and also each of the IoT devices gives a preference over the subset of task requesters. The preference lists of both parties (i.e., task requesters and IoT devices) are private in nature. Given such a scenario, we aim to allocate the best possible IoT device to each task requester from his/her revealed preference list. For this purpose, a truthful mechanism is proposed, and it is proved that it is computationally efficient. Simulation results show that the proposed mechanism outperforms the benchmark mechanism.