Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) are two United States (US) territories in the Pacific, caught at the crossroads of the competition between two great powers—the United States and China. Their relationship with the United States differs; CNMI pursued a covenant with the United States, establishing its commonwealth status in 1976, while Guam became an unincorporated territory through a US Congressional act in 1950. Both rely heavily on tourism and US support, yet their ties to China differ. The Chinese market, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, comprised almost 40% of the CNMI’s tourism market, compared to just over 1% for Guam. Guam’s economy is increasingly reliant on the military defense budget, making up 45.1% of its GDP, and the United States is committing over $2 billion primarily for the military infrastructure in the CNMI. As the US military infrastructure expands in Guam, the self-determination and decolonization movements are also gaining momentum. However, the CNMI chooses instead to discuss key issues with the Trump administration, which include the resumption of air service between China and the CNMI. The question arises, how will the two US territories, Guam and the CNMI, align themselves in the US-China conflict? The authors argue that neither Guam nor the CNMI will align with China. However, they also have no choice in their position, despite the growth in the decolonization movement and the CNMI’s continued economic decline.

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Guam and Northern Mariana Islands

  • Grace Donaldson,
  • Kevin K. W. Ho

摘要

Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) are two United States (US) territories in the Pacific, caught at the crossroads of the competition between two great powers—the United States and China. Their relationship with the United States differs; CNMI pursued a covenant with the United States, establishing its commonwealth status in 1976, while Guam became an unincorporated territory through a US Congressional act in 1950. Both rely heavily on tourism and US support, yet their ties to China differ. The Chinese market, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, comprised almost 40% of the CNMI’s tourism market, compared to just over 1% for Guam. Guam’s economy is increasingly reliant on the military defense budget, making up 45.1% of its GDP, and the United States is committing over $2 billion primarily for the military infrastructure in the CNMI. As the US military infrastructure expands in Guam, the self-determination and decolonization movements are also gaining momentum. However, the CNMI chooses instead to discuss key issues with the Trump administration, which include the resumption of air service between China and the CNMI. The question arises, how will the two US territories, Guam and the CNMI, align themselves in the US-China conflict? The authors argue that neither Guam nor the CNMI will align with China. However, they also have no choice in their position, despite the growth in the decolonization movement and the CNMI’s continued economic decline.