This chapter interrogates the limits of liberal justice by examining how dominant frameworks reduce injustice to procedural failure or distributive imbalance. Engaging critically with Iris Marion Young and Nancy Fraser, it shows how liberal proceduralism and redistributive models marginalise structural power, misrecognition, and historically produced exclusion. The chapter identifies a “consensus illusion” at the heart of liberalism, through which dissenting practices—such as anger, refusal, and insurgent critique—are delegitimised as irrational or non-political. Against this tendency, the chapter argues for a reorientation of political theory that treats conflict, antagonism, and epistemic plurality not as obstacles to justice, but as necessary conditions for confronting injustice as it is lived.

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Normative Silences and the Limits of Fairness

  • Asis Mistry

摘要

This chapter interrogates the limits of liberal justice by examining how dominant frameworks reduce injustice to procedural failure or distributive imbalance. Engaging critically with Iris Marion Young and Nancy Fraser, it shows how liberal proceduralism and redistributive models marginalise structural power, misrecognition, and historically produced exclusion. The chapter identifies a “consensus illusion” at the heart of liberalism, through which dissenting practices—such as anger, refusal, and insurgent critique—are delegitimised as irrational or non-political. Against this tendency, the chapter argues for a reorientation of political theory that treats conflict, antagonism, and epistemic plurality not as obstacles to justice, but as necessary conditions for confronting injustice as it is lived.