This chapter examines the role of moral consensus in liberal political theory and its implications for how legitimacy, justice, and political subjectivity are conceptualised. Focusing on the work of John Rawls, Thomas Nagel, and G. A. Cohen, it shows how liberal appeals to consensus rely on a rational subject abstracted from history, social location, and relations of power. While intended to secure impartiality, this abstraction systematically brackets structures such as caste, slavery, empire, and patriarchy, rendering them peripheral to moral reasoning. The chapter contrasts this framework with what it terms the historical position—an alternative starting point for political theory that begins from embodied experience, historical domination, and lived antagonism rather than hypothetical agreement. Drawing on the political thought of Ambedkar, Fanon, Mills, and Spivak, the chapter reorients political theory from imagined moral consensus to the realities of structural injustice. In doing so, it challenges the liberal imaginary that treats disagreement as a problem to be resolved, and instead foregrounds conflict, exclusion, and refusal as constitutive features of political life.