This chapter analyses the legal strength of the European Union’s powersPowers in economic governance, focusing on the extent to which Member States are bound by EU rulesRules and economic coordination mechanisms. It proposes a methodological framework to assess the binding nature of legal acts, distinguishing between their internal (degree of obligationObligation) and external (enforcementEnforcement in practice) dimensions, and applies it to both hard and soft lawSoft law instruments. Special attention is given to the pervasive use of soft law—particularly recommendationsRecommendations—in economic governance, whose formal non-binding nature contrasts with their practical and sometimes sanction-linked effects. The analysis covers EU primary and secondary law, as well as international frameworks such as the TSCG and ESMESM, highlighting variations in legal force across preventive, corrective, and assistance procedures. While corrective mechanisms like the EDPEDP and EIPEIP display stronger normativeNormative and enforcement capacity, preventive tools such as the MSP rely mainly on political pressure. Ultimately, the chapter concludes that EU economic governance operates in a constitutionally intergovernmental field, where legal obligations can significantly constrain national fiscal autonomy, but enforcement remains subject to political discretion—except in financial assistance contexts, where compliance is more strictly compelled.