The work is divided into three major sections. The first section addresses the role of the question of truth in the historical development of philosophy and shows how the increasing abandonment of this question—now often dismissed as a pseudo-problem—leads to the “anthropocentrization” and fragmentation of philosophical inquiry in contemporary philosophy. The second section is devoted to the development of the correspondence theory of truth, particularly in Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and Kant. The third section deals with all other conceptions of theories of truth, which have mostly developed as counter-models to the obvious contradictions of the correspondence theory, and demonstrates that, precisely in these cases, implicit ontological presuppositions must be taken as given. Building on this, the concept of metadoxy is introduced, which refers to those pre-conceptual elements of our conceptual thinking, along with the thesis that every act of thinking inherently contains an implicit claim to correspondence with reality, yet can itself only produce meta-conceptual structures, which it must simultaneously assume AS reality in order to be able to develop any notion of truth at all. The less aware we are of these pre-conceptually implicit presuppositions in the formation of theoretical constructs for the description (or explanation) of reality, or the more logically incomplete they are, the more we refer to them through the feeling of certainty as the very ground of the truth claim itself, and must refer to them. It is precisely in this construction, which at the same time first makes conceptual thinking possible, that the correspondence arises, which we are compelled to claim as the correspondence to reality. Regardless of its justifiability, this pre-conceptual assumption of correspondence is therefore both the starting point and the endpoint of every attempt at knowledge through conceptual thinking.