This chapter addresses the limitations of Tarski’s concept of truth and Donald Davidson’s approaches to extending it. Tarski defines truth formally for clear and unambiguous sentences in formal languages, which is often insufficient for human communication. Davidson criticizes this formal restriction and emphasizes that meaning and truth are anchored in the use of language and in the communicative practice of speakers. He proposes that the theory of meaning must also be a theory of truth that is universally valid, independent of any particular language. Davidson rejects the search for a formal definition of truth and stresses the importance of the pragmatic application and use of the concept of truth. In conclusion, it is argued that no formal theory can provide a definitive truth; rather, every theory necessarily contains unprovable but possibly true sentences. The validity of formal systems thus rests not only on their rules but also on an implicit reference to reality. A theory of truth must therefore reveal the conditions under which sentences are true and consider the relationship to reality, without restricting itself to formal definitions.