The following chapter deals with “instrumental theories of truth,” focusing in particular on the pragmatic approaches of William James and Charles Sanders Peirce. It discusses how the concept of truth can be understood from the perspective of human cognitive interests, regardless of whether reality is actually represented objectively. Key points include that the concept of truth is defined by its usefulness to humans, not by objective correspondence with reality. James’s concept of truth links utility with belief, whereby convictions are often based on incomplete information and shaped more by the will to believe than by logical coherence. The “feeling of conviction” plays a central role here, and this feeling does not necessarily rest on logical consistency. James sees truth as a process of verification that arises from practical orientation to action and the consequences of belief. The correspondence of thoughts with reality is evaluated by their practical usefulness. It is critically noted that the problem of induction and the theory-ladenness of observation call objective truth-finding into question. In contrast, Popper argues that scientific statements can only be considered empirical and scientific if they are falsifiable. Popper criticizes logical empiricism and emphasizes that general theories cannot be proven by observation, but only refuted. Habermas criticizes the correspondence theory of truth and highlights that truth is achieved through discourse and the potential agreement of all. He emphasizes that we can only grasp reality through our concepts and terms, and bases the claim to truth on rational justifiability, which is achieved through argumentative processes.