Immanuel Kant’s theory of truth differs markedly from traditional correspondence and coherence theories. Kant does not view truth as an agreement between understanding and reality, since reality is accessible to us only through the lens of our understanding. This position criticizes the classical correspondence theory as circular and the coherence theory as inadequate for making statements about reality. Instead, Kant develops his own form of correspondence theory, which he calls “transcendental truth.” This is based on the internal order of the understanding, which contains a priori categories that form the foundation of all knowledge. Kant argues that our cognition occurs in two steps: the senses provide us with raw material, which the understanding then shapes into meaningful patterns and regularities. These “pure concepts of the understanding” or “categories” are independent of experience and make possible our knowledge of the empirical world. In contrast to Wolff and Baumgarten, who derive transcendental truth from the internal order of things, Kant relocates this order into consciousness and makes it a concept immanent to consciousness. This means that the agreement of our concepts with objects is only made possible by the transcendental conditions of the understanding. Therefore, only that knowledge can be considered true which is not only logically consistent but also takes into account the conditions of the possibility of experience. Through this “Copernican revolution,” Kant emphasizes the central role of the understanding in cognition by placing the structure of cognitive faculties before the question of the agreement between representation and reality. His aim is to provide metaphysics with the secure path of a science by investigating the foundations of human cognitive capacity. Kant’s reflections on epistemology are based on the idea that we are first given sensible intuitions before our understanding structures them. The unity in the forms of intuition, space and time, therefore cannot be conditioned by the understanding. However, this leads to a dilemma: either this unity stems from transcendental apperception, which results in a circular argument, or it derives from the nature of space and time themselves, which would be nonsensical since we cannot know their true nature. For us, space and time are concepts structured by the understanding, through which our sensible intuitions already receive a unity. To address this, Kant develops his doctrine of the schematism of the power of judgment, which enables mediation between sensible intuitions and concepts of the understanding. He refers to these mediating representations as “transcendental schemata,” which are both intellectual and sensible and possess a temporal structure. Time functions here as the medium that orders all our representations and gives them a unified structure. Space and time are fundamental structures of consciousness in which we are necessarily compelled to think. Heidegger criticizes Kant’s approach and argues that the imagination is not merely a mediator but the common root of sensibility and understanding. He locates the foundation of cognition in “time grasped in its essence.” It remains unclear, however, whether time is merely a form of our intuitions or also a determining factor of the real world. Ultimately, for Kant, it remains unresolved what the connection between concepts and intuitions actually rests upon. Heidegger attempts to close this gap by assuming time as an objective structure of the world of things, but fails to provide proof for this. Kant, therefore, cannot offer a complete correspondence theory, since for him time is only a form of our intuitions and not necessarily a property of things in themselves.