The third premise P3 of the Argument of Supererogation holds that morally valuable actions that are not considered duties are labeled supererogations (see Sect. 2.3.2). A Strong Rationalist Supererogationism characterizes supererogations as morally valuable actions for which there are rational reasons why one reasonably cannot want them to be duties despite their moral value (see Sect. 7.5.4). Since there are two types of such reasons, however, there are two types of supererogations either. A morally valuable action is an ultraerogation if one (despite its moral value) reasonably cannot want it to be a duty because the action would endanger or destroy the moral actor as a moral actor (see Sect. 9.1). If there are other rational reasons not to want a morally valuable action to be a duty, the action is a decencyerogation (see Sect. 9.2). An action is merely a pseudoerogation, however, if it only appears to be a supererogation because a closer examination proves it not to be morally valuable contrary to initial perception (see Sect. 9.3).