The fourth premise P4 of the Argument of Supererogation states (see Sect. 2.3.2), that supererogations belong to the deontic category of permitted actions. However, this is already outdated at this part of the book, because the debates to the Supererogationism of Permitted Omissions (see Sect. 4.4) already demonstrated that supererogations are better characterized as morally voluntary actions (see Sect. 4.5). This, however, raises the Irrationality Problem of supererogations. Why do actors supererogate voluntarily despite the action is not a duty on the one hand but demands high sacrifices on the other hand (see Sect. 10.1)? Chapter 10 defends the thesis that superogations are rational because they are done out of strong moral motives which originate from a voluntary self-commitment to an ambitious project of one’s future moral self (see Sect. 10.2). Thereby, two other questions can be answered. We admire supererogators morally because their actions express a high degree of moral freedom (see Sect. 10.3). Not the supererogators but their supererogations are aesthetically attractive because ultraerogations concern the aesthetic category of the sublime and decencyerogations the aesthetic category of the beautiful (see Sect. 10.4).