The epistemological foundation of the essay is a conceptual-logical understanding of perspectivism. The conceptual basis of perspectivism discovered by Kaulbach (“Philosophie des Perspektivismus,” 1990) and Stegmaier (“Philosophie der Orientierung,” 2008) is subjected to an “originalist” conceptual analysis and expanded. It will be shown that concepts such as “position,” “direction,” “horizon,” “domain,” “context,” “point of view,” “relatum,” etc., are not mere metaphors, but constitute elements of every epistemic situation. They condition every attempt to see through an epistemic object (perspicere). The disclosure of the quasi-aprioristic conceptual matrix and the corresponding regularities of the basic structure of cognition establishes perspectivism as an independent research program for the analysis of the factors that condition epistemic situations and lead to statements, for example of a metaphilosophical nature. In this way, they can be subjected to thorough critique, deconstruction, and reconstruction.