According to Kant, the distinction between persuasion and conviction is problematic from a psychological point of view. However, it also presents difficulties from the theoretical point of view. These difficulties are intertwined with those related to the typology of modes of holding-to-be-true (Fürwahrhalten). The definitions of opinion, belief, and knowledge present obscure points, and their relation to the fundamental distinction between persuasion and belief offers further ones. The essay attempts to bring clarity to these issues, which have been much discussed in the recent literature. On the one hand, it points to the persistence in the Critique of Pure Reason of elements of the Wolffian tradition, which are ill reconciled with the new perspective that Kant proposes. On the other, emphasis is placed on Kant’s assumption of a first-person perspective, which must be taken into account in the interpretation of the concept of Fürwahrhalten and its forms; and on the fact that it is the reflexive relation to the typology of foundations of Fürwahrhalten and not its epistemic value and degrees of certainty that can allow for a coherent definition.