Chapter 7 adds further support to my argument both for the significance of protest without blame and against the attributionist position on blameworthiness. It does so by engaging with Talbert’s Victim Objection to volitionist views of blameworthiness, a recent indirect argument for an inclusive construal of blameworthiness. Talbert argues that we need blame wherever there is ill-willed wrongdoing to support victims’ needs. The chapter challenges this in two ways. First, it argues that protest without blame is a response that can satisfy these needs if it is appropriately attuned to the offense. The Victim Objection rests on the mistaken assumption that only blame can serve victims’ interests. Second, I argue that the Victim Objection, were it to go through, would prove too much because even unambiguously excused agents can victimise. This highlights again that responses to agents and responses to conduct must be theorised separately.