Chapter 5 discusses the fittingness conditions of moral objections. It goes through different possible ways of understanding the concept of moral objectionability and especially argues against a content view that understands the objectionability of an attitude or action in terms of its content or the judgments it is based on. The chapter argues that objectionability should rather be understood in terms of criticisability: an attitude is objectionable if it can be criticised on relevant grounds. I argue that these grounds must be understood as related to the deontic in a particular way: a piece of conduct is objectionable if a potentially deontic reason can be given against it, where potentially deontic reasons are those that decisively count against this piece of conduct and obligate the agent, given her abilities and circumstances, to the degree that they can guide their attitudes in light of this reason. The chapter closes with drawing out some implications of this view and discusses how the concept of objectionability adds to the kinds of moral significance we can ascribe to other agents’ conduct.