Chapter 9 presents the results of the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) regarding the drivers of policy liberalization in labor immigration governance for low-skilled occupations (LILSO). It addresses the second set of research questions concerning the conditions under which democratic governments relax admission and integration policies. The chapter is structured around three analytical models: a generic model for liberalized policy in general (LPU), and two system-specific models for less restrictive (LPL) and more restrictive (LPM) governance types. The analysis identifies that no single condition is necessary for liberalization; instead, policy change results from specific configurations of economic, international, and domestic factors. Model #1: Liberalized Policy (Unclassified Systems): This model covers 83 policy changes. The “Enhanced Most Parsimonious Solution” identifies four paths to liberalization: “Re-Directing Migrants” (combining employer demand with high refugee numbers and simple policy mixes), two paths of “Low Political Barriers” (linking employer demand or policy diffusion with weak right-wing populism), and “Low Policy Barriers” (linking policy diffusion with simple policy field relations). Model #2: Less Restrictive Regimes (LPL): In systems already characterized by openness, liberalization occurs through “Limited Openness” (policy diffusion combined with low humanitarian pressure) or a “Zero-Sum Game.” The latter reveals a trade-off where LILSO liberalization is contingent on restricting other migration fields, often in the absence of typical pro-immigration drivers like employer demand. Model #3: More Restrictive Systems (LPM): For restrictive systems to deviate from their path, “Unchallenged Employer Demand” (high demand plus weak unions) or “Deflection/Competition” (policy diffusion plus high refugee numbers, facilitated by weak populists or simple policy mixes) are sufficient. The chapter synthesizes these results into three overarching narratives: (1) The Revised Classical Recipe: Challenges the purely economic argument by showing that employer demand only leads to liberalization when combined with weak trade unions, low political barriers (weak right-wing populists), or the incentive to redirect humanitarian migration. (2) The Neighbors’ Club: Highlights the power of international policy diffusion (spatio-temporal interlinkages). It suggests that governments often follow the liberalizing lead of neighbors to remain competitive for labor, provided domestic political or policy barriers are low. The (3) Zero-Sum Game: Specifically relevant to less restrictive systems, this story emphasizes the high political costs of openness, where further liberalization in one area often requires restrictive “compensations” in others to maintain political equilibrium.