Is there something particularly morally problematic about human germline gene editing, to the extent that it would warrant another moral approach than weighing the pros against the cons, or asking whether it violates any moral principles or norms? In this chapter the ethical arguments discussed in the previous chapters is revisited via the perspective of risk. The relevant risks are divided into three different kinds—technical, social, and moral and metaphysical risks—and it is also discussed what the “most severe kind of risks” would be. Are there things that we could not live with having permanently lost? If so, are any such losses that we could bring about through some practices of germline gene editing? What would that be and is it a realistic risk?

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Lingering Concerns

  • Madeleine Hayenhjelm,
  • Christer Nordlund

摘要

Is there something particularly morally problematic about human germline gene editing, to the extent that it would warrant another moral approach than weighing the pros against the cons, or asking whether it violates any moral principles or norms? In this chapter the ethical arguments discussed in the previous chapters is revisited via the perspective of risk. The relevant risks are divided into three different kinds—technical, social, and moral and metaphysical risks—and it is also discussed what the “most severe kind of risks” would be. Are there things that we could not live with having permanently lost? If so, are any such losses that we could bring about through some practices of germline gene editing? What would that be and is it a realistic risk?