A separate chapter could well be devoted to the development of a project for an experimental phenomenology. At first glance, the very notion of naturalising phenomenology may appear oxymoronic, since, with Husserl, phenomenology was born and developed precisely on the opposite premise: the irreducibility of conscious life. Yet experimental phenomenology, understood as a “science of observables in act”, can be conceived as a distinct and legitimate form of naturalisation. This approach is due above all to the work of Paolo Bozzi, who provided its most rigorous epistemological formulation by making explicit the experimental method of his teacher, Gaetano Kanizsa. Bozzi may be considered one of the last heirs of Gestalt psychology, a tradition that, in many respects, already constitutes a form of experimental phenomenology. Its aim is to determine the conditions under which a given phenomenon emerges, identifying the dependent and independent variables involved. The operations carried out for this purpose are strictly experimental yet remain entirely within the domain of lived observation. The entire range of operations thus stays co-planar with the field of the observable. This is the defining feature of experimental phenomenology: the element that distinguishes its method from other approaches in experimental psychology concerned with the study of perception.