Time, Movement, and Perceptual Genesis
摘要
The most vivid expression Merleau-Ponty uses to indicate the thrust of his attempt to shape a new ontology, drawn from the notes of his 1953 lectures, is that of movement as a “revelator of being” (révélateur de l’être). To understand this claim, we must turn in particular to lectures 7 and 8 of the Course, where the theme of “apparent movement” is addressed through the analysis of “stroboscopic movement.” As the explicit references show, Merleau-Ponty’s main source in these passages is Chap. 7 of Kurt Koffka’s The Principles of Psychology. Several authors to whom Merleau-Ponty refers (for instance Wertheimer, Duncker, Ternus, and Metzger) are discussed there as well. What concerns us, however, is his reading of these experiments and of the related arguments, in order to show how Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological method—his way of working in close connection with experimental psychology—still represents today one of the most relevant models of phenomenology.