The paper addresses the problem of justifying fundamental logical principles, asking how they can be assessed without falling into vicious circularity or infinite regress, given that any form of rational justification appears to presuppose them. It argues that logic should be understood as a normative science, analogous to disciplines such as ethics and politics, a view also endorsed by Prawitz. Drawing on insights from semantic inferentialism and logical expressivism, particularly in Brandom, the paper proposes a neopragmatist method for the revision of logic based on reflective equilibrium between general theoretical considerations and particular inferences. Within this framework, the notion of normative bidirectionality is developed, with special emphasis on what is termed “upward normative pressure,” which captures the dynamic and a posteriori character of the revision of logical principles. This notion helps to explain the emergence of non-classical logics by analogy with revisions in political and ethical normative systems. Rather than defending reflective equilibrium against its critics, the paper aims to show that it can serve as a viable method for revising logic in a context where the normativity of logic is grounded in the normativity of natural language, in line with the inferentialist perspective.