Beyond Rationalism: Intuition, Habit, and Tacit Orientation defends the philosophical legitimacy of non-propositional modes of knowing. Drawing on Bergson, Hume, and Polanyi, it argues that instinct—understood as intuition, habit, and tacit integration—is not opposed to reason but constitutes its enabling ground. Reason remains indispensable, yet it presupposes a pre-reflective orientation it cannot itself generate.

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Beyond Rationalism: Intuition, Habit, and Tacit Orientation

  • Leandro Loriga

摘要

Beyond Rationalism: Intuition, Habit, and Tacit Orientation defends the philosophical legitimacy of non-propositional modes of knowing. Drawing on Bergson, Hume, and Polanyi, it argues that instinct—understood as intuition, habit, and tacit integration—is not opposed to reason but constitutes its enabling ground. Reason remains indispensable, yet it presupposes a pre-reflective orientation it cannot itself generate.