Efficiently masking multiplications in software is a long standing and extensively studied problem. A variety of gadgets have been proposed to perform these multiplications, each offering different trade-offs between efficiency and security. However, almost all existing solutions rely on arithmetic masking, in which multiplications cannot be naturally protected. In this work, we introduce two novel gadgets, named A2S and S2A, that enable conversions between arithmetic masking and Shamir’s Secret Sharing (SSS)-based masking. With this approach, multiplications can be performed naturally and securely in a sharewise manner. We prove that our gadgets achieve SNI security, which provides security guarantees and straightforward composability. Moreover, we demonstrate that composing them with multiplication yields PINI security. We then provide a detailed complexity analysis and discuss the contexts where our gadgets are most relevant. As a case study, we apply them to the MQOM post-quantum signature scheme, a candidate in the second round of the NIST additional post-quantum digital signature standardization process. When computing the sensitive multiplications in MQOM, for masking order \(t=1\) , our approach reduces the number of multiplications, additions, and randomness requirements by 31%, 71%, and 60%, respectively, compared to the state of the art, while incurring only small additional memory overhead. We further show that these gains not only hold but actually increase as the masking order grows. Our results demonstrate that arithmetic-to-SSS conversions provide an effective and scalable path toward efficient masked implementations, making them particularly attractive for post-quantum cryptography.