While psychological theories of moral progress have proliferated in recent years, the specific improvement of moral intuitions remains underexplored and calls for systematic investigation. This chapter aims to address that gap by advancing a theory of moral intuitions’ progress. Drawing on a dyadic conception of moral intuitions, I define such progress as the improvement in automatically evaluating harm and help according to normative standards (Sect. 5.2). To assess moral intuitions’ progress from a noncircular standpoint, I adopt procedural objective norms derived from mathematical and scientific knowledge, which provide standards of informed and empirically grounded moral intuitions (Sects. 5.3 and 5.4). I then examine the mechanisms by which such progress occurs, distinguishing three forms of improvement based on enhanced interpretation of agency, patiency, and causation (Sect. 5.5). Finally, I consider how improvements in moral intuitions can contribute to, or reinforce, broader processes of progressive social change (Sect. 5.6).