Moral intuitions are distinct from intuitions of other kinds by virtue of their moral content. This chapter provides a definition of this content by exploring the cognitive templates that underlie intuitive categorizations of actions as moral or immoral. Building on and refining the theory of dyadic morality, I argue that moral intuitions arise from templates for prototypical harmful and helpful actions. These templates share a dyadic structure, describing a causal relationship between two minds: an agent, capable of intention and planning, and a patient, capable of experiencing suffering or benefits. The chapter begins by addressing the challenges of defining moral content (Sect. 3.1) before exploring the harm (Sect. 3.2) and help (Sect. 3.3) templates, reviewing the evidence on the intuitiveness of harm and help. Section 3.4 illustrates how the dyadic templates are rooted in human action cognition and the cooperative evolutionary function of morality. Finally, I address objections questioning the primacy of harm and help in moral judgment (Sect. 3.5).