Advances in technology have driven tremendous changes in transaction costs. Firms now have increasing choice concerning which functions to do in-house versus which to acquire via contract in the open market. Ronald Coase’s seminal article The Nature of the Firm (1937) identified these choices as critical to determining the size and shape of firms; under the theory, the nature of the firm was a product of comparative choice between “command-and-control” within firms, and contracting in the open market outside firms. Increasingly, this choice involves decisions about which functions may be profitable, yet may expose firms to prosecution for the violation of criminal law. This Article argues that technology is enabling the growth of “crime-adjacent firms.” Using examples, it fits these firms within the theory of transaction cost economics, arguing that they seek to derive profits from contracting on the open market with those who the firms know or reasonably should know are committing criminal violations. Technological development allows these firms to profit from and direct such actors while keeping them outside the boundaries of the firm.