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The demands increasingly placed on distribution grids by moving from simple distribution to bidirectional flows of future smart distribution grids that must also be constrained to ensure robust operation require a substantial increase in instrumentation for distribution networks. This instrumentation represents a possible target for both isolated and coordinated attacks, given the large number of nodes and distribution. In this paper we therefore study mechanisms for enhanced resilience for the control and communication (C2) paths as the topology of the actual power network is assumed to involve greater cost in modification. We explore algorithms over a hierarchical multilayer graph model in which multiple distant adversaries can manipulate C2 paths and vertices in future smart distribution grids and study how the grid operator can retain full or partial control over the distribution network under these circumstances, discussing different scenarios under different adversarial capability assumptions, study both static and dynamic adversaries, as well as conservative and risk taking defense approaches a grid operator can take.

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Optimal Pathways in Hierarchical Smart Distribution Grid Models with Large Scale Adversarial Attacks and Dynamic Adversaries

  • 会议论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年

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  • Nataša Gajić,
  • Stephen Dirk Bjørn Wolthusen

摘要

The demands increasingly placed on distribution grids by moving from simple distribution to bidirectional flows of future smart distribution grids that must also be constrained to ensure robust operation require a substantial increase in instrumentation for distribution networks. This instrumentation represents a possible target for both isolated and coordinated attacks, given the large number of nodes and distribution. In this paper we therefore study mechanisms for enhanced resilience for the control and communication (C2) paths as the topology of the actual power network is assumed to involve greater cost in modification. We explore algorithms over a hierarchical multilayer graph model in which multiple distant adversaries can manipulate C2 paths and vertices in future smart distribution grids and study how the grid operator can retain full or partial control over the distribution network under these circumstances, discussing different scenarios under different adversarial capability assumptions, study both static and dynamic adversaries, as well as conservative and risk taking defense approaches a grid operator can take.