There’s nothing natural, at first glance, in making Law a variant of hermeneutics, if we consider that the vocation par excellence of Law is to establish a clear text and univocal norms that aim to drastically limit the possibilities of interpretation. This is no accident, since clarity and unambiguity make a decisive contribution to the security of the legal system, the stability of the social order and the legitimacy of political power. The ideal of clarity and unambiguity of legal statements requires a spontaneous understanding that is accessible to all, a prerequisite for the efficiency of the law. The problem addressed in this contribution is that the ideal of unambiguity and clarity of the law comes up against the harsh reality of its applicationApplication. Even before it is applied, the text of the law, because it is written in natural languages, can suffer from gaps, confusion, obscurity and equivocality. It is because the law involves problematicities of meaning that it calls par excellence for a hermeneutic, and this at all levels of its elaboration and implementation. It is for this reason that we can consider the law as a regional hermeneutic of texts, while contributing elements of its own. The challenge of the present contribution, based on the discussion of the École de l’exégèse and the realist theory of Law, is to determine whether the recognition of the hermeneutic character of Law implies that any relationship to the meaning of the legal norm necessarily and at all times requires an interpretative activity, particularly when the text is deemed clear and intelligible.