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The intellectual revolution of the twelfth century was largely based on the ‘rediscovery’ of ancient texts, on which the thought and teaching of the late Middle Ages were built. For legal science, no less than for other disciplines, this revolution was not a tabula rasa, quite the contrary. Medieval legal hermeneutics therefore consisted in revitalising this ancient knowledge. This was reflected in two ways: the rediscovery of the Justinian Compilations (late eleventh century) for roman law, and the publication of the Concordia discordantium canonum, also known as the Decretum Gratiani (around 1140), for canon law. Far from being a purely intellectual work, these interpretative techniques have an undoubted practical resonance. Indeed, in a context where there was no political unity, it was through these interpretations of doctores legum that students gained access to the law as part of their studies. And it is on the basis of these texts and common methods that judges, lawyers, notaries and jurists who surround political power at various levels are trained. The aim of this paper is to follow the evolution of interpretative techniques of these two corpus. On this point, romanists and canonists have their own specificities. One of these is fundamental: the Corpus iuris civilis is not intended to evolve, whereas canon law constitutes legislation in progress, so to speak. Nevertheless, they draw their techniques from common sources and there is a hermeneutical unity. It is therefore necessary to review the content and structure of the two corpus, before examining the status of auctoritas conferred on these texts by those who interpret them. The consequences of this are fundamental in terms of how to reconcile different laws and canons that might at first appear contradictory. Examples drawn from the most influential jurists (Azo, Accursius, John the Teutonic, Bartolus, etc.) will mark out our contribution. The terminus ad quem is the fifteenth century, a period during which legal humanism considerably renewed the interpretation of these texts.

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Ancient Sources, Medieval Interpretations: The Role of Legal Texts in Shaping Medieval Jurisprudence (Twelfth–Fifteenth Centuries)

  • 章节

  • 发表日期：

    2026年

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  • Alexandre Karsenty

摘要

The intellectual revolution of the twelfth century was largely based on the ‘rediscovery’ of ancient texts, on which the thought and teaching of the late Middle Ages were built. For legal science, no less than for other disciplines, this revolution was not a tabula rasa, quite the contrary. Medieval legal hermeneutics therefore consisted in revitalising this ancient knowledge. This was reflected in two ways: the rediscovery of the Justinian Compilations (late eleventh century) for roman law, and the publication of the Concordia discordantium canonum, also known as the Decretum Gratiani (around 1140), for canon law. Far from being a purely intellectual work, these interpretative techniques have an undoubted practical resonance. Indeed, in a context where there was no political unity, it was through these interpretations of doctores legum that students gained access to the law as part of their studies. And it is on the basis of these texts and common methods that judges, lawyers, notaries and jurists who surround political power at various levels are trained. The aim of this paper is to follow the evolution of interpretative techniques of these two corpus. On this point, romanists and canonists have their own specificities. One of these is fundamental: the Corpus iuris civilis is not intended to evolve, whereas canon law constitutes legislation in progress, so to speak. Nevertheless, they draw their techniques from common sources and there is a hermeneutical unity. It is therefore necessary to review the content and structure of the two corpus, before examining the status of auctoritas conferred on these texts by those who interpret them. The consequences of this are fundamental in terms of how to reconcile different laws and canons that might at first appear contradictory. Examples drawn from the most influential jurists (Azo, Accursius, John the Teutonic, Bartolus, etc.) will mark out our contribution. The terminus ad quem is the fifteenth century, a period during which legal humanism considerably renewed the interpretation of these texts.