This chapter refines the “Nature” end of the political spectrum by conducting a critique of intrinsic value within environmental ethics, arguing for a necessary conceptual refinement to support the book’s core thesis. It begins by contrasting eco-centrism (which intrinsically values nature) with the ambiguous concept of anthropocentrism, which is rejected as an analytically empty term that fails to provide a substantive opposing political value. The chapter proposes a vital distinction in the intrinsic value of nature, cleaving the concept along the lineages of its two forefathers: Moorean Intrinsic Value and Kantian Intrinsic Worth. Moorean Value concerns the abstract, non-person-related value of “naturalness” as a state of affairs (e.g., Robert Elliot’s Faking Nature), which is identified as the relevant intrinsic value for the Nature-Technology spectrum and the proper subject of this book. Conversely, Kantian Worth concerns the value of biota as moral persons (e.g., Peter Singer’s sentience-based utilitarianism and Tom Regan’s rights-based deontology). The chapter demonstrates how these two values are not only distinct but can be actively opposed (e.g., animal welfare goals versus naturalness goals), clarifying confusion within environmentalism.