This chapter analyzes policy dismantling in Argentina’s cash assistance system during Javier Milei’s first year in office, focusing on the contrast between direct and intermediary-mediated transfers. It examines two programs: the Asignación Universal por Hijo (AUH), a conditional cash transfer paid directly to caregivers of children, and Potenciar Trabajo, a welfare-to-work style program that combined individual transfers with subsidies to intermediary organizations (Unidades de Gestión). Using the dismantling framework developed by Cejudo, Olvera and González (2026), the chapter argues that Milei’s government actively dismantled Potenciar Trabajo—freezing benefits, auditing and purging rolls, eliminating subsidies paid to the implementing units, and replacing the program with two time-limited direct assistance schemes (Volver al Trabajo and Acompañamiento Social)—while simultaneously reinforcing the AUH through benefit increases and inflation-adjusted indexation. This reconfiguration reduces policy density and intensity for working-age adults, reinforces assistance centered on children and families, and shows how anti-corruption and efficiency narratives can legitimize visible dismantling in contexts of economic crisis.