The reliability and security of Internet routing are increasingly challenged by applications with strict service requirements, where connectivity and traffic engineering play a central role. While operators apply traffic engineering to optimize performance and resilience, these decisions can inadvertently amplify routing security risks. Existing mechanisms such as BGPSec, RPKI, and ASPA remain insufficient due to limited deployment, leaving open questions about how traffic engineering practices and connectivity affect routing security. To address this, we propose a methodology that combines measurements from both the control and data planes. We use the PEERING Testbed to announce prefixes on the Internet using different traffic engineering techniques, such as AS Path Prepend, more specific announcements, and selective route announcements, and hijack our prefixes to understand the interplay between traffic engineering and prefix hijackings. Our results show that prepending can increase the impact of a hijack from 17% to 67%, and that the way an AS connects to other networks—its connectivity structure—can also determine its exposure to prefix hijacks. We further demonstrate that hijacking via more specific prefixes is particularly effective, achieving up to 100% of both control and data plane targets. Based on these findings, we provide a comprehensive view of the current announced address space, showing that 61.4% of the address space may be facing a higher exposure to prefix hijackings due to ASes’ traffic engineering practices.