This chapter illustrates how Jonas elevates the concept of freedom to a foundational ontological status in his interpretation of life. Freedom, Jonas argues, is an inherent structural element of life, present even at the earliest stages of organic development as metabolism, and extending to the most complex forms of animal and human existence. However, freedom is paradoxically intertwined with necessity; while life “can” renew itself, it “must” do so in order to survive. This dialectic gives rise to antinomian traits within living beings, distinguishing the development of plant life from animal life, and animal life from what is uniquely human. Importantly, though, Jonas focuses on the commonality shared across these stages: the ontological dimension of freedom. He avoids abstractly hypostatizing freedom, but interprets it relationally, as intrinsically linked to the concept of responsibility.

错误:搜索内容不能为空,请输入英文关键词
错误:关键词超出字数限制,请精简
高级检索

Human Beings and Freedom

  • Angela Michelis

摘要

This chapter illustrates how Jonas elevates the concept of freedom to a foundational ontological status in his interpretation of life. Freedom, Jonas argues, is an inherent structural element of life, present even at the earliest stages of organic development as metabolism, and extending to the most complex forms of animal and human existence. However, freedom is paradoxically intertwined with necessity; while life “can” renew itself, it “must” do so in order to survive. This dialectic gives rise to antinomian traits within living beings, distinguishing the development of plant life from animal life, and animal life from what is uniquely human. Importantly, though, Jonas focuses on the commonality shared across these stages: the ontological dimension of freedom. He avoids abstractly hypostatizing freedom, but interprets it relationally, as intrinsically linked to the concept of responsibility.