Over twenty new countries among the former Soviet satellites and republics experienced dramatic political transitions and transformations in the 1990s. Many of these regime changes led to long-term violent conflicts and wars, such as those in former Yugoslavia, the Caucasus region, Central Asia, and, most recently, Ukraine. Conversely, others, such as the Baltic States, succeeded in establishing and consolidating democratic institutions. This was also seen to a much lesser extent in countries like Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, and Moldova. In this chapter, I will contribute to the extensive literature on these topics and argue that another factor affecting the abilities of these countries to complete the democratic transition process relates to the level of inclusiveness or exclusiveness with which they have implemented transitional justice measures. I contend that, firstly, during the early transition and institution-building phase of the 1990s, most of the new leadership in countries such as Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Russia came directly from the communist-socialist nomenclature, with very limited transitional justice measures put in place. In contrast, the Baltic States, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia, which had already voted to leave the Soviet Union prior to the March 1991 referendum, later experienced mass protests in their capitals advocating for independence, sovereignty, and democracy, making it impossible for their leaders to retain the Soviet frameworks and forcing a more thorough transition. Whenever governments have implemented transitional justice measures in their transitions, democratic institution-building has had a better chance to succeed and become more resistant to anti-democratic movements.

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Transitional Justice and Transitology in the Post-Soviet Space

  • Anja Mihr

摘要

Over twenty new countries among the former Soviet satellites and republics experienced dramatic political transitions and transformations in the 1990s. Many of these regime changes led to long-term violent conflicts and wars, such as those in former Yugoslavia, the Caucasus region, Central Asia, and, most recently, Ukraine. Conversely, others, such as the Baltic States, succeeded in establishing and consolidating democratic institutions. This was also seen to a much lesser extent in countries like Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, and Moldova. In this chapter, I will contribute to the extensive literature on these topics and argue that another factor affecting the abilities of these countries to complete the democratic transition process relates to the level of inclusiveness or exclusiveness with which they have implemented transitional justice measures. I contend that, firstly, during the early transition and institution-building phase of the 1990s, most of the new leadership in countries such as Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Russia came directly from the communist-socialist nomenclature, with very limited transitional justice measures put in place. In contrast, the Baltic States, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia, which had already voted to leave the Soviet Union prior to the March 1991 referendum, later experienced mass protests in their capitals advocating for independence, sovereignty, and democracy, making it impossible for their leaders to retain the Soviet frameworks and forcing a more thorough transition. Whenever governments have implemented transitional justice measures in their transitions, democratic institution-building has had a better chance to succeed and become more resistant to anti-democratic movements.